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Restructuring the Security Council 
Toby D.J. Mendel* 
The Charter of the United Nationsl was designed during the 
latter part of World War II and came into force in 1945. Since then, 
changes have occurred which have dramatically altered the nature of 
international relations. These changes include the demise of colonial-
ism, the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with important 
repercussions for other nations espousing a socialist ideology, and the 
rise or fall in international prominence of many nations. These changes 
in the international balance of power and division of political affiliation 
must be accompanied by practical and structural changes at the United 
Nations. The current political organization of the United Nations is no 
longer capable of effectively and equitably regulating international 
relations. 
The core political entity at the United Nations is the Security 
Council. The Security Council is comprised of five permanent members-
the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(until its demise in 1991), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America2- and ten non-
permanent members elected from the General Assembly for a term of 
two years. A great deal of power is vested in the Security Council, with 
special powers accorded to the permanent members. There may well be 
a need for a small executive group within the United Nations to 
effectively carry out its mandate. It is less clear, however, that the five 
states listed above should have permanent membership in this elite club. 
The arrangement of the Security Council immediately brings two ques-
tions to mind. The first is whether the current composition of the 
Security Council reflects modern international power broking reality? 
The second is whether there should be any members who sit perma-
nently on such an important body? 
Powers of the Security Council 
Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations grants the 
Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance ofinterna-
tional peace and security." Chapter VI of the Charter mandates certain 
powers with respect to pacific settlement of any dispute including the 
power to call upon the parties to settle,3 investigate,4 and recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 5 Chapter VII deals 
with the powers of the Security Council in the face of a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Article 41 allows the 
Security Council to impose economic, political, and communication 
blockades that are binding on the rest of the General Assembly. Article 
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42 allows for such military action as is necessary in light of a failure to 
solve the problem using measures mandated under Article 41. Finally, 
Article 12 requires the General Assembly not to make any recommenda-
tion with respect to any matter being dealt with by the Security 
Council.6 
The powers of the Security Council cannot be underestimated. 
They are analogous to the enforcement powers of the police in most 
states. The Security Council has the added advantage ofbeing both self-
regulating and immune from external disciplinary interference. The 
conflagration in Iraq, in 1991, indicates how pervasive these powers can 
be. The standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union has, 
until recently, substantially prevented the exercise of these powers; it 
seems unlikely, however, that international politics will, in future, 
interfere unduly with the extensive powers granted to the Security 
Council. 
Article 27 gives each member of the Security Council one vote 
and provides that decisions on procedural matters be made by an 
affirmative vote of at least nine members. All other matters, however, 
must be affirmed by at least nine members, including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members.7 This power is commonly referred to 
as the right of veto and allows any one of the five permanent members 
to paralyse any non-procedural proposal. Article 109 gives the perma-
nent members a similar sort of veto over amendments to the Charter 
itself.8 
This political organization thus concentrates power in the Secu-
rity Council and then gives five of the 160 members extraordinary veto 
powers. At face value these powers would seem to operate only nega-
tively, that is, only in a way that would prevent action being taken. In 
practice, however, the ability to stymie any action also carries enormous 
negotiating power which may effectively be used to advance policies 
advocated by a permanent member. The arrangement at the Security 
Council thus increases the power of the permanent members in respect 
to decisions and strategies of all the United Nations bodies. 
Are the Right Nations Permanent Members? 
'"c. 
It is hard to justify the current permanent membership of the 
United Nations Security Council no matter which criteria are used: 
gross national product or other economic indicators; population; mili-
tary prowess; geography, either in terms of size or regional distribution; 
and/or general international influence. France and the United Kingdom 
are obvious candidates for exclusion. Japan, Germany, and India have 
among the most compelling reasons for inclusion. The fate of the Soviet 
Union's seat is not clear. As of this writing, Russia was 'volunteering' to 
take over the Soviet Union's role, but it seems clear that they have no 
right to unilaterally take over a position which members of the United 
Nations gave to another, quite different, political entity. It seems, 
however, that some of the remaining permanent members have accepted 
this arrangement, at least in principle. 
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France and the United Kingdom may claim that their colonial 
influence, still extant despite the demise of colonialism itself, justifies 
their permanent position since international influence is the main 
criterion. This argument is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that 
both the Francophonie and the Commonwealth grew out of the influence 
of the colonizing states should not guarantee those states a dispropor-
tionate amount of power. Both organizations are run along democratic 
lines and no longer reflect the inequality present in their genesis. 
Secondly, such influence is geographically confined and, hence, not an 
acceptable consideration at the United Nations. Any natural influence 
deriving from a colonial past should be wielded through post-colonial 
institutions and not through the United Nations. 
Are Permanent Members Necessary? 
Can such a fundamentally undemocratic system be defended? 
There are those who would argue that international law is no more than 
an institutionalized law of the jungle and thus it is appropriate that the 
more powerful have disproportionate representation. If this were 
strictly true, there would be no need for the United Nations and many 
current members would never have joined an organization based on such 
an ideology. A more fundamental criticism of this philosophy is that it 
runs counter to the whole basis of the Charter which is founded in 
concepts such as equality of nations, respect for national sovereignty, 
cooperation, peace, and self-determination.9 
Another defence of the status quo at the United Nations is that 
while democratic institutions are theoretically desirable and a worth-
while goal, the current reality of international relations and the status 
of international law preclude a fully democratic international mecha-
nism. This argument posits that the present structure of the United 
Nations is the best, or at least an acceptable, compromise between the 
competing forces of democracy and the reality of powerful international 
interests. 
Modern democracies all entail a trade-off between a notionally 
equal input by all members and the need to function practically. Thus, 
in Canada, we delegate an impressive array of governing powers to 
bodies elected once every four or five years. While in power, those elected 
have far more political power than ordinary citizens, but we accept this 
as a practical system for running a democracy. Such compromises, 
however, must be tailored carefully to institutional realities, allow for 
reasonable group representation, and be subject to controls to prevent 
abuse. All of these safeguards are lacking with respect to the permanent 
members of the Security Council. 
The Charter of the United Nations reflects international con-
cerns in the aftermath of the Second World War. At best, it represents 
an outlook which, though current at that time, is no longer acceptable. 
Colonialism was still very much in force. There was a tension between 
the capitalist and communist blocs and the Allies were intent on 
developing an international institution capable of preventing the rav-
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ages the world had just experienced. At worst, the Charter could be 
dismissed as being a product primarily of European and North American 
thinking. In 1945, very few African states were independent, most of 
Asia was either under colonial administration or politically unsettled, 
;md South America was largely dominated by the United States. At that 
·time, only a small proportion of those developing countries which had 
attained independence could allocate the level of human and other 
resources necessary to adequately contribute to the process of interna-
tional constitution building. 
Prevention of war remains an important role of the United 
Nations and delegation of power to take action on behalf of the United 
Nations to the Security Council is practical. This requirement cannot 
justify the concept of permanent membership on the Security Council. 
The permanent members have been active in many of the wars the 
United Nations should have been trying to prevent or, at least, to 
mitigate. Clearly, permanent membership makes it extremely difficult 
for the United Nations to take an active role in such disputes. In 
addition, the pervasive influence of the permanent members often 
discourages members of the General Assembly from being as critical as 
they might otherwise be, thus reducing attempts to discourage acts of 
violence through channels normally available to the General Assembly. 
There is simply no mechanism to prevent abuse of power by permanent 
members in a conflict of interest situation. 
One might argue, as a practical matter, that non-members 
would be reluctant to participate in Security Council mandated activi-
ties to prevent aggression. It is, therefore, necessary to preserve 
permanent membership of the most powerful nations to ensure their 
participation in such activities. The one true example of Security 
Council cooperation in this area, the military operation against Iraq in 
1991, exposes the fallacy of this argument: many nations neither within 
the area directly affected by the conflict nor on the Security Council were 
represented militarily and it is hard to imagine that mere exclusion from 
the Security Council would have deterred American enthusiasm. 
Permanent membership on the Security Council runs contrary 
to one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, the idea of 
equality.10 In practice, those states with greater resources will tend to 
wield a disproportionate amount of power irrespective of the formal 
structure used. To formally accord them this power, however, seriously 
undermines the goal of equality and no longer serves the objectives for 
which the power was originally granted. The potential for abuse of the 
veto power and its use to further goals other than those for which it was 
intended have been discussed with respect to acts of aggression above. 
It would be very difficult to institute controls to prevent misuse of these 
powers. The ability of permanent members to influence even non-
Security Council affairs through their extraordinary power further 
erodes the principle of equality of members of the United Nations. 
The most important reason to abolish permanent members of 
the Security Council is the profound structural change in international 
relations that has occurred since the Charter was signed. On one hand, 
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the tension between the communist bloc and the Western European 
nations no longer exists. On the other hand, the end of colonialism has 
brought about a rise in prominence ofless developed countries. This has 
shifted the focus in international relations from an East-West bias to a 
North-South one. Unfortunately, the composition of the Security Coun-
cil does not reflect these changes. For example, the developed countries 
represent approximately twenty per cent of the world's population but 
occupy eifhty per cent of the permanent positions on the Security 
Council.I 
Developing nations have often found themselves caught be-
tween two superpowers hungry to increase their international influence. 
While this was not a fortunate position for less wealthy nations to be in, 
the tension between competing superpowers helped prevent some of the 
worst abuses. Many developing countries are now worried that, without 
hindrance from the defunct communist bloc, the United States will be 
able to pursue its international goals to the detriment of their sover-
eignty and self-determination. Using its position on the Security Council 
and its economic and military clout, the United States is now able to 
'promote' its values and ideas with less international opposition than 
ever before. Very few states supported the actions ofiraq in the summer 
of 1990, but many developing countries were apprehensive of the ease 
with which the United States was able to achieve its objectives at the 
Security Council. It is essential that developing nations, who now 
seriously lack adequate representation on the Security Council, be given 
a greater say. 
Conclusion 
Several profound changes in the international scenario since the 
signing of the Charter militate in favour of abolishing the tremendous 
concentration of power represented by permanent membership in the 
Security Council. These changes include the demise of colonialism; the 
break-up of the Soviet Union and its political, economic and military 
bloc; and changes in international influence of United Nation member 
states. Reasons which may have supported permanent Security Council 
membership in 1945 no longer exist today. Given the commitment of the 
United Nations to egalitarianism and the lack of a compelling reason to 
continue an otherwise outdated system, permanent membership in the 
Security Council should be abolished. If permanent membership is to be 
retained, it should be brought into line with modern reality. Actual 
should replace historical international influence as one of the criteria. 
In light of the shift in international focus from an East-West to 
a North-South bias, it may be appropriate to allocate veto powers to 
regional Regional affiliations are growing ever stronger 
and the recent proliferation of states makes regional representation 
even more practical. Representatives with a veto power could be elected 
for a certain period of time by regional member states. The concentration 
of power represented by a veto could be moderated by being subject_ to one 
of several control mechanisms. One possiblilty could be a democratic 
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right to remove the veto holder exercisable by the whole United Nations, 
the Security Council and/or the rest of the representatives from the 
region in question. This would prevent the state temporarily holding the 
veto from abusing its extraordinary rights. Such a system would prevent 
powerful nations or groups of nations from exerting disproportionate 
influence and guarantee that the Security Council truly represented the 
whole world. This would represent a significant step toward making the 
United Nations the egalitarian body it purports to be. 
* Third year law student, Dalhousie University. 
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